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Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions,
emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people’s motor
actions and action intentions. ‘Empathy’ allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations
with others. ‘Theory of mind’ allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or
wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the speciﬁc neural networks
engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others.
However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual
appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social
setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such
interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these
cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes
modulate the interactions of these low-level biases.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Neuroeconomics, the subject of this special issue, is
concerned with the neural basis of decision making. In
this contribution, we will review the experiments
exploring the role that social cognition plays when
individuals make decisions. Neither social cognition
nor, indeed, decision making are unitary cognitive
processes.So,our reviewwillcoveranumberofdifferent
themes, rather than presenting a uniﬁed framework.
However, one theme that emerges as somewhat more
all encompassing than others concerns the tension
between reason and emotion when making decisions.
This may overlap with the conﬂict between automatic
and controlled processes. This tension particularly
arises in the social domain. We shall brieﬂy explore this
theme in the last part of this paper.
A recent deﬁnition of social cognition is as follows:
‘Social cognition explains the mechanisms of social
behavior using concepts and methods shared with
related ﬁelds of cognitive psychology and cognitive
science’ (Winkielman & Schooler in press). The study
of social cognition has a long history, but this study has
been revitalized in recent years by the advent of non-
invasive brain imaging techniques leading to the new
discipline of social cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner &
Lieberman 2001). The advantage of the cognitive
approachtopsychologyingeneralandtosocialbehaviour
in particular is that, by specifying the underlying
processesusingtermsborrowedfrominformationtheory
and computer science, it is possible to bridge the gap
between mental processes and brain function. Decision
making is just one of the many areas in which social
cognition has a role. In this contribution, we will only
discuss decision making by individuals. We will not
discuss the fascinating topic of how social groups make
decisions, since, as yet, there are few experiments
attemptingtolinkgroupdecisionswithneuralprocesses.
2. THE BRAIN’S MIRROR SYSTEMS
The discovery of mirror neurons in the frontal and
parietal cortex of the monkey brain (Rizzolatti &
Craighero 2004) has had a huge impact on social
cognitive neuroscience. Mirror neurons become active,
not only when the monkey makes a speciﬁc action
(e.g. picking up a peanut), but also when the monkey
observes someone else making the same action. While
claims that the existence of mirror neurons can explain
social cognition in general, ranging from imitation to
language development and theory of mind, are
certainly exaggerated (e.g. Jacob & Jeannerod 2005),
mirror systems are relevant to some fundamental
processes in social interaction. Through the automatic
activation of mirror systems when observing the
movements of others, we tend to become aligned with
them in terms of goals and actions.
In humans, it is only rarely possible to measure the
activityinsingleneurons(butseeHutchisonetal.19 99 ),
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applicable to data from brain imaging. A brain region is
considered to be part of a mirror system or a shared
network if it is activated during performance of the
action as well as during the observation the same action
being performed by another person. Of course, this
effect might occur even if there were no mirror neurons
present in that region, but rather intermingled popu-
lationsofaction andobservation neurons(Dinsteinetal.
2007). Using this deﬁnition, shared networks have been
identiﬁed for sensations, emotions as well as for motor
actions. For example, activity can be elicited in primary
and secondary somatosensory regions, not only when
the subject is touched, but also when the subject sees
someone else being touched in the same place (Keysers
et al.2 0 0 4 ; Blakemore et al. 2005). The extension of the
idea ofmirror systems to the domainofemotions has led
to empathy research in the context of social neuro-
science (see below).
(a) Imitating action
The mirror effects that occur when observing motor
actions can occur without awareness and seem to be
largely involuntary. Observing someone performing an
action different from our own, for example moving
their arm up and down while we are moving ours from
side to side, will cause our actions to become more
variable and less accurate (Kilner et al. 2003). In this
experiment, the effect was speciﬁc to observation of
people. It did not occur when the movements were
being made by a robot arm. A more recent experiment
(Stanley et al. 2007) showed that this effect depends on
who the subjects think the movements are being made
by. In the experiment by Stanley and colleagues, a dot
was presented, which moved with either a biologically
plausible or implausible velocity proﬁle. However, the
interference was determined, not by the velocity
proﬁle, but by whether the subjects thought the dot
represented human- or computer-generated move-
ment. Thus, our mirroring of the actions of others
seems to depend upon whether or not we believe them
to be people like ourselves, with whom we can engage
in social interactions. And indeed this tendency to
imitate is at its strongest during social interaction. If the
person performing actions is making eye contact with
us, strong neural activation is elicited by the movement.
But if the person acting has their back to us, their
movements elicit very little activity (Kilner et al. 2006).
This neural activity elicited by action observation,
which is most marked when we are in social contact
with another agent like ourselves, can spill over into
overt imitation. When two people interact they tend to
unconsciously mimic each other’s postures, manner-
isms and facial expressions (the chameleon effect;
Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Furthermore, when this
mimicry occurs the interaction occurs more smoothly
and the partners like each other better. People with
high ratings on empathy scales exhibit this mimicry to a
greater extent than others. However, these effects seem
to occur only when people are unaware that mimicry is
occurring (Lakin & Chartrand 2003).
The experience of mimicry goes beyond an increase
in liking for the person who is mimicking us. There is
generalized increase in prosocial behaviour. After
having been mimicked, we are more likely to donate
money to charity even when asked by people who were
not directly involved in the mimicry situation (van
Baaren et al. 2004). Presumably, this is an example of
afﬁliative behaviour causing us to put greater emphasis
on the beneﬁts of the group rather than the self when
making decisions.
(b) Joint action
In the case of the chameleon effect, the two people who
are interacting generate joint actions in which simple
movements are mirrored. However, this imitation
(or sharing) can also occur at more abstract levels
concerned with goals. This kind of sharing can affect
the speed with which decisions are made. Sebanz et al.
(2003) had subjects perform a choice reaction time task
incorporating a spatial compatibility effect. The cue to
respond was a ﬁnger wearing a red or a green ring, the
colour indicating which button should be pressed.
However, the ﬁnger also pointed left or right. This
spatial cue was irrelevant. In one condition, the task
was performed by a single subject who simply had to
press the left button whenever the ring was red. In this
condition, there was no interference from the irrelevant
spatial cue, i.e. the reaction time was not slowed when
the ﬁnger pointed to the right.In another condition, the
ﬁrst subject was joined by a second subject who pressed
the right button whenever the ring was green. In this
condition, the subject was performing exactly the same
task as in the ﬁrst condition. Nevertheless, a spatial
compatibility effect now appeared in the reaction times
of both subjects (see also Tsai et al. 2006). It seems that
when acting together each subject automatically
represented the task requirements and goals of the
other subject as well as their own. In this particular
case, such representations resulted in a slowing of
reaction times. An fMRI study of this task (Sebanz et al.
2007) showed that performance in the presence of a
co-actor elicited increased activity in ventral premotor
and orbitofrontal cortices. These results suggest that
knowing about the potential actions of a partner
increases the relevance of stimuli referring the self
and also increases the need to monitor one’s actions.
In this example, although the subjects were perform-
ing their tasks at the same time, no cooperation was
needed to perform these tasks. When joint action
requires cooperation, shared representations of task
requirements and goals are very important in order to
achieve better performance. Such sharing is referred to
as common knowledge (Clark 1996)o ralignment
(Pickering & Garrod 2004) and has been studied
extensively in experiments on discourse. Some of these
shared representations are established through cultural
norms, but alignment of representations at many levels
will develop during the course of an interaction. Once
again such alignment largely occurs automatically and
with little awareness. Furthermore, this automatic
emergence of shared representations occurs only
when we interact with biological agents. Again, the
interference effect observed by Sebanz and colleagues
occurred for a human hand only, but not for a wooden
hand (Tsai & Brass 2007).
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Our ability to understand other people is not restricted
to our capacity to understand their action intentions.
Successful social interaction very frequently also
requires an understanding of the other’s emotional
and motivational states, i.e. our capacity to empathize
with others (for a detailed deﬁnition of terms, see also
de Vignemont & Singer 2006). Our ability to share the
emotions of others has long been recognized.
How selﬁsh soever man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or
compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery
of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive
it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow
from the sorrowof others, is a matter offact too obvious
to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment,
like all the other original passions of human nature,
is by no means conﬁned to the virtuous and humane,
though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite
sensibility. The greatest rufﬁan, the most hardened
violator of the laws of society, is not altogether
without it.
Introduction to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam
Smith (1759)
The idea that perception–action links in our brains
enable us to understand other peoples motor action
has been expanded to include the ability to share not
only motor actions but also feelings and sensations
with others (Preston & de Waal 2002; Gallese 2003;
Decety & Jackson 2004; Decety & Lamm 2006;
de Vignemont & Singer 2006). Recent empathy studies
have indeed brought accumulating evidence for such
shared neural networks in the domain of emotions.
Early studies focused on emotional contagion
triggered by the mere perception of emotional
expressions in faces. It could be observed that the
sight of the facial expression of disgust elicits activity in
the same regions as direct exposure to a disgusting
smell (Wicker et al. 2003). Likewise, the sight of a
fearful face elicits activity in the same regions as direct
exposure to a fearful object (Morris et al. 1996). This
emotional response to the fear and disgust of others has
obvious advantages for survival. If someone looks
afraid, then we should be vigilant since there is
probably something nearby that we too should avoid.
If someone looks disgusted, it is probably wise to check
what we are eating ourselves in case the food is bad.
However, imitation is not always the most appropriate
response to the emotions of others. For example, rather
than expressing anger oneself, the most appropriate
response to another’s expression of anger might well be
a complementary expression that achieves appease-
ment, such as the expression of embarrassment
(Keltner & Buswell 1997).
Such shared networks are not only observed when
we are presented with emotional stimuli. We also
empathize with others when we know that someone is
suffering in the absence of any explicit emotional
stimulation. Singer et al. (2004b),f o re x a m p l e ,
measured empathic brain responses in pain-relevant
brain areas elicited by the sheer knowledge that your
partner suffered pain. More speciﬁcally, she recruited
couples and measured empathy in vivo by assessing
brain activity in the female partner while painful
stimulation was applied either to her own or to her
partner’s right hand who was sitting next to her in the
MRI room but whom she could not see. Differently,
coloured ﬂashes of light on a visible screen pointed to
either the scanned subject or her partner’s hand,
indicating which of them would receive painful
stimulation and which would receive non-painful
stimulation. This procedure enabled the measurement
of pain-related brain activation when pain was applied
to the scanned subject (felt pain) or to her partner
(empathy for pain). The results suggest that parts of the
so-called ‘pain matrix’, predominantly bilateral
anterior insula (AI) and the anterior cingulate cortex,
were activated when subjects experienced pain them-
selves as well as when they saw a signal indicating that a
loved one had experienced pain. Activation in this
network was also observed when subjects saw an
unknown but likeable person suffering pain (Singer
et al. 2006), when subjects watched videos showing
body parts in potentially painful situations (Jackson
et al. 2006), painful facial expressions (Lamm et al.
2007) or hands being pricked by needles (Morrison
et al. 2004, 2007). For a review, see de Vignemont &
Singer (2006).
Further studies suggest that empathic brain
responses are not just an automatic all or none
response, but that the presence and the magnitude of
these empathic brain responses can be modulated by
different factors such as the affective link to the other
person, the perceived fairness of the other (Singer et al.
2004a, 2006), the subject’s appraisal of whether the
reason the other person is suffering is justiﬁed (Lamm
et al. 2007), the frequency of a person’s prior exposure
to pain-inducing situations (Cheng et al. 2007) and the
intensity of the inﬂicted pain (seeing a needle pricking
versus penetrating a muscle; Avenanti et al. 2006). As
with the observation of actions, observation of other
people’s emotions often spills over into overt mimicry.
We wince when we see another person in pain.
Furthermore, this response is much greater when we
are in some sort of social contact with the person we are
observing. Bavelas and colleagues (Bavelas et al. 1986)
measured mimicry when subjects observed the victim
of an apparently painful injury. This mimicry was
signiﬁcantly enhanced when the observer and the
victim were in eye contact. It seems that, when we
believe we are engaged in a social interaction, we
experience, or at least express, more empathy.
So far, social neuroscientists have mostly focused on
phenomena such as emotional contagion and empathy,
whereby the former connotes a reaction in which one
shares an emotion with another person without
realizing that the other person’s emotion was the
trigger. By contrast, empathy requires the awareness
that our affective state was elicited by another person’s
affective state. However, how empathy enables the
development of other-regarding motivation (empathic
concern or compassion) with an associated helping
behaviour is still unclear (see also de Vignemont &
Singer 2006). Future research will have to focus on the
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how empathy and prosocial decision making are linked.
4. ‘THEORY OF MIND’ IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
Most social interaction is also strongly inﬂuenced by
our more abstract beliefs about who we are interacting
with rather than the actual behaviour or motivational
state of the other.When we are interacting with another
person, we assume that they have minds like our own
and try to predict their behaviour on the basis of the
contents of their minds: their beliefs and desires. This is
referred to as having a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack &
Woodruff 1978), taking an intentional stance (Dennett
1987), or mentalizing (Frith 1989). Mentalizing has
been studied using a wide range of tasks including
reading stories (Fletcher et al. 1995; Saxe & Kanwisher
2003), looking at cartoons (Brunet et al.2 0 0 0 ;
Gallagher et al. 2000) or watching simple animations
(Castelli et al. 2000). In spite of the wide range of
material used, a small set of brain regions is reliably
activated in all these studies including medial pre-
frontal cortex/paracingulate cortex (MPFC), posterior
superior temporal cortex and the temporal poles (see
Frith & Frith 2003 for a review). However, a
disadvantage of all these studies is that the tasks used
are ‘off-line’. That is, the subjects in the studies are not
themselves directly engaged in a social interaction.
Rather, they are observing and interpreting the
interactions of others. By contrast, when the subjects
play simple economic games, developed in the frame-
work of game theory, they are directly involved in a
social interaction. Mentalizing is important for these
economic games also.
(a) The intentional stance
The importance of who we believe we are interacting
with is shown in a series of studies of simple interactive
games. In the study of McCabe et al. (2001), the
subjects played a trust and reciprocity game (iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma) against a human counterpart or a
computer. In the subjects who cooperated there was
more activity in MPFC when playing with a person
than with a computer.Aswehaveseen, MPFC is one of
the brain regions consistently activated when subjects
perform tasks in which they have to think about the
mental states of others. Rilling et al. (2004) made a
similar observation with subjects who played either the
ultimatum game (see below) or Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. Once again, the activity in brain regions
concerned with theory of mind, including MPFC,
was stronger when playing with a human partner than a
computer. The subjects in this experiment were told
they were either playing against a human or a computer
that chose its responses randomly. In fact, however,
whether the partner was said to be human or computer,
the play was identical. Thus, the effect was created by
what the subjects believed about their partners rather
than the actual run of the play.
The same design was used by Gallagher et al. (2002)
in an experiment where subjects played the game rock–
paper–scissors. Greater activity was seen in MPFC
when subjects believed they were playing against a
human as opposed to a computer. In this case, the
computer was said to use simple, predetermined rules
based on the subject’s last response. Once again, during
the critical scanning window, the play of the ‘human’
or the ‘computer’ did not actually differ, being a
random sequence. After scanning, subjects were asked
to report on their subjective experience with the
different opponents. All subjects reported that the
two conditions ‘felt’distinctly different. The experience
of playing the human was described as an interaction
with a rational agent with distinct beliefs, intentions
and desires. By contrast, the computer was described as
behaving according to some prior design. This
difference was not simply that the human seemed
the more difﬁcult opponent. The subjects felt under
much greater time pressure when playing against
the computer.
These results suggest that, when subjects believe
they are paying against another person, they think
about the mental states of this person (mentalizing).
This ‘intentional stance’ (Dennett 1987) is adopted to
a much lesser extent when playing against a computer.
However, the results do not reveal what precise effect
this intentional stance has on the strategies of play that
are used. By its nature the rock–paper–scissors game
does not lend itself to strategic analysis. However, there
is some evidence about a possible role for mentalizing
in the ultimatum game and the related dictator game.
For example, a child’s ability to mentalize (i.e.
successfully perform theory of mind tasks) was found
to be positively related to the likelihood of cooperating
in Prisoner’s Dilemma games and to making fair offers
rather than very small proposals in the ultimatum game
(Sally & Hill 2006).
In the ultimatum game, one player (the proposer) is
given a sum of money and then must choose how much
to offer the other player (the responder) who may
accept the offer or refuse it. A refusal means that both
parties get nothing. If people act on the basis of rational
self-interest, then the responder should accept anyoffer
however small. Otherwise he will get nothing. On this
basis, the proposer should offer very little, since small
amounts should be accepted by the responder.
However, this is not what actually happens. In the
ultimatum game, the majority of responders will refuse
offers of less than a third of the total (see Camerer &
Thaler 1995 for a review). The responders consider
that small offers are ‘unfair’, a matter to which we shall
return later. If the proposer wants his offer to be
accepted, he has to take the responder’s view of small
offers into account. He has to predict whether or not
the responder will consider that his offer is fair. In other
words, he must think about the responder’s view of his
offer, an example of mentalizing (see also Singer & Fehr
2005; McCabe & Singer 2008).
This requirement does not apply to the dictator
game. In this game, the proposer grants the second
player a proportion of the money which that player is
bound to accept. So, the proposer has no need to take
account of what the responder thinks about fairness,
since the responder is obliged to accept his offer. We
would therefore expect lower offers to be made in the
dictator game. Consistent with this analysis, offers
made in the dictator game are indeed signiﬁcantly
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made in the dictator game are about half those made in
the ultimatum game (Forsythe et al. 1994).
However, the offers made in the dictator game are
still substantial, at approximately 20 per cent of the
total. Why should the proposer give anything away in
this game? Here too mentalizing may have a role. The
idea of a rational economic man who is concerned only
to maximize his wealth is often traced back to Adam
Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’. ‘It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest.’ However, in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Smith suggested that underlying the drive
to acquire wealth is a more fundamental desire to
acquire a good reputation.
That we are held in consideration is both ‘the most
agreeable hope’ and ‘the most ardent desire of human
nature’. No one except the perfect sage and the man
depraved to the rank of beasts can remain indifferent to
the lure of public recognition. There is no price that we
are not ready to pay to acquire it, since ‘men have
voluntarily thrown away life to acquire after death a
renown which they could no longer enjoy’.
Adam Smith’s (1759) Theory of Moral Sentiments
(from Todorov 1996,p .6 )
Models of cooperation have recently incorporated
the possibility of ‘image scoring’ and reputation
formation as promoters of cooperation (Nowak &
Sigmund 1998a,b; Wedekind & Milinski 2000). That
generosity in the dictator game depends, in part, on the
wish for a good reputation in the eyes of others is
supported by the observation that smaller offers are
made when the proposer has complete anonymity
(Hoffman et al. 1996). The role of the ‘gift’ in society
and the prestige it brings have been studied intensively
by anthropologists (Mauss 1924) and extends from
traditional potlatch rituals where a leader strengthens
group relations and acquires honour by giving away
large amounts of goods to modern phenomena such
as open source software and Wikipedia to which
many people freely donate their time and expertise
(Zeitlyn 2003).
Thinking about our reputation requires second-
order mentalizing. We have to represent what someone
else is thinking about us. We have proposed (Amodio &
Frith 2006), although as yet the evidence is not strong,
that the anterior rostral MPFC might have a special
role in this reﬂexive representation of what others think
about us (see also Saxe 2006). This region is activated
when thinking about our own mental states as well as
when thinking about the mental states of others
(Mitchell et al. 2005). Activity in this region has also
been observed when subjects make unintended
responses suggestive of race prejudice, but only when
such responses are being observed by others (Amodio
et al. 2006).
This reﬂexive form of mentalizing is especially
important in games involving repeated economic
exchanges. For cooperation to develop in such games
it is important to estimate how much I can trust my
partner. But it is equally important for me to persuade
mypartner to trust me and for me to be able to estimate
how well I have succeeded in this endeavour. Perhaps
this is the role of MPFC, which, as we have already
seen, is often activated during the playing of such
games, especially when subjects are cooperating
(McCabe et al. 2001). Of particular interest in this
context is the study from Read Montague’s group
(Tomlin et al. 2006). In this experiment both partners
in a trust and reciprocity game were scanned. In each of
10 rounds, one player (the investor) invested an
amount of money (investment phase) that was tripled
and sent to the other player (the trustee) who decided
to repay some fraction of the tripled amount (repay-
ment phase). A striking effect was observed in the
cingulate cortex such that a different pattern of activity
was observed for the investment phase compared with
the repayment phase. In particular, the activity in the
most anterior region of the anterior cingulate was much
greater when a subject learned what his partner was
repaying, than when the subject made his own
investment. The authors of this study suggest that
these differences in activity reﬂect a mechanism for
distinguish ‘me’ and ‘not me’ when assigning credit for
the shared outcome. However, we prefer an alternative
account concerned with reputation. It is at the point of
repayment that a subject learns to what extent he is
trusted by his partner and this is the time at which
maximal activity is seen in the anterior MPFC.
The need to mentalize, whether to predict what our
partner is going to do next or to manipulate our
reputation in his eyes, does not arise if we are playing
against a computer (Rilling et al. 2004) or a person who
is simply following a predetermined sequence of
instructions (Singer et al. 2004a). As we have already
seen, when subjects believe they are playing against
such partners, signiﬁcantly less activity is observed in
brain regions concerned with mentalizing, including
MPFC. There are also behavioural changes consistent
with a different approach to the game. When the
offer in the ultimatum game is based on the spin of a
roulette wheel, much lower offers are accepted (Blount
1995). The same result was observed by Rilling et al.
(2004) when subjects believed the offer was being made
by a computer.
5. REASON AND EMOTION
While mentalizing certainly plays a prominent role in
economic decision making and social exchange, there
is also an important role for emotional responses.
This has been revealed by studies of the effect offrontal
lobe damage on many aspects of decision making
(e.g. Bechara et al. 2000). In relation to economic
decision making, our sense of fairness, altruistic
punishment, trust and framing effects are good
examples for domains in which emotions can interfere
with rational decisions.
(a) Our sense of fairness
For example, our ability to mentalize may help to
determine what the next moves or intentions of the
other players might be, but emotions also play an
important role in the assessment of the fairness of the
offer. It is this feeling of fairness that we will now
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reason a responder does not behave as a rational
economic man should is through a desire for reputation
rather than wealth. However, a long-standing idea
(see Damasio 1994) is rather that rational decisions are
spoiled by emotional responses. For example, low
offers in the ultimatum game are considered to be
unfair and this feeling of unfairness is usually
accompanied by strong emotions and activity in brain
regions, such as the AI, associated with feelings (Sanfey
et al. 2003). Furthermore, the higher the activity in the
AI the more likely the offer is to be rejected. The
justiﬁcation for this interpretation in terms of emotion
is that the activity in the AI has often been associated
with subjective feeling states, such as the subjective
unpleasantness of painful stimulation (Craig 2002)o r
the feeling of disgust (Wicker et al. 2003): it reﬂects
how pleasant or unpleasant we feel a situation to be.
It is this emotional response that makes people behave
in an ‘irrational’ way.
(b) Altruistic punishment
The implicit assumption is that this emotional response
makes the decision less than optimal. However, in a
group setting, turning down unfair offers can be seen as
a good decision. When the responder turns down an
unfair offer in the ultimatum game, he is effectively
punishing the proposer who will not get any money as a
result of the refusal. This is an example of altruistic
punishment since the responder foregoes monetary
gain in order to punish the proposer.
Altruistic punishment has been shown to have a vital
role in maintaining the cooperation in groups (Gintis
2000; Bowles & Gintis 2002, 2004; Fehr & Gachter
2002; Boyd et al. 2003). In common good games
involving several players, the group beneﬁts from the
investments of individual players. Each time an
individual invests, the group as a whole gains while
the individual investor loses a little. As long as everyone
invests, every one also gains. But in such situations free
riders will inevitably appear. These players accept the
beneﬁt from the investments of others while with-
holding their own money. The free-riding individuals
gain at the expense of the group. Once free riders have
appeared in the group, cooperation breaks down. If,
however, altruistic punishment is possible, then free
riding is reduced and cooperation ﬂourishes (Fehr &
Gachter 2002). Here, altruistic punishment is applied
even though it brings a material loss to the individual
player. But while the individual may lose each time he
applies punishment, he beneﬁts in the long run from
the increased cooperation occurring in the group.
A loss to the individual is converted into a gain for
the group.
Gurerk et al. (2006) compared two experimental
institutions, one of which sanctioned punishment while
the other was sanction free. In spite of the initial
aversion to the institution with sanctions, after some
experience with the sanction-less institution subjects
migrated to the other institution. The sanctioning
institution became strongly cooperative, while the
sanction-free institution became depopulated.
Altruistic punishment clearly has an important role
inmaintainingcooperation in groups. What is its neural
basis? de Quervain et al. (2004) measured brain activity
while subjects learned about a defector’s abuse of trust
and determined the punishment. Delivery of altruistic
punishment was associated with activity in the dorsal
striatum and subjects with greater activity in this region
were prepared to incur greater costs in order to punish.
From both animal and human studies, the striatum
(a component of the basal ganglia) is known to have
a major role in associating rewards with actions
(Delgado 2007).
Related observations were made by Singer et al.
(2006). In this study, subjects played a trust game with
two other players (confederates of the experimenter) in
the course of which they learned that one player was a
cooperator (playing fairly) while the other was a
defector (playing unfairly). Subsequently, the subjects
observed the two players receiving pain. Empathy-
related activity was observed in pain-related brain areas
(AI and anterior cingulate) when the fair player
received pain, but this activity was signiﬁcantly reduced
for the unfair player. In addition, in the male subjects,
the knowledge that the unfair player was receiving pain
was associated with activity in reward-related regions
of the striatum. The magnitude of this activity
was correlated with the subjects’ expressed desire
for revenge.
These results suggest that the ‘emotional’ responses
observed in these social interactions have an important
role in ensuring that the long-term interests of the
group are given greater weight than the short-term
interests of the individual. They may ensure that, when
we are interacting with other people, we have empathy
for those who cooperate and a desire to punish those
who defect.
(c) Trust
Another salient dimension in economic decision
making often associated with emotional activation in
the brain is trust. How do we know whom to trust and
how do we learn to trust?
Studies have shown that when confronted with faces
of people never seen before, subjects consistently rate
some faces as appearing less trustworthy than others.
This ability to recognize trustworthiness in faces is
impaired in patients with damage to the amygdala
(Adolphs et al. 1998). Furthermore, confrontation with
such apparently untrustworthy faces elicits activity in
the amygdala (Winston et al.2 0 0 2 )i nn o r m a l
volunteers. This activity reﬂects a negative evaluation.
These are people to be avoided. This effect also appears
to occur rather automatically. It occurs whether we are
explicitly rating the faces for trustworthiness, but is just
as strong if we are rating the faces for some other
feature that is not relevant to trustworthiness.
Although there is good agreement about the kinds of
faces that look untrustworthy, there is no evidence that
this attribution has any validity. This is an example of
prejudice. On the other hand, we can rapidly learn to
recognize people as untrustworthy. Bayliss & Tipper
(2006) used eye gaze direction as cues in spatial
attention task. The faces of some people reliably
gazed in the same direction as the upcoming target
(valid cues), while other people consistently gazed in
the wrong direction (invalid cues). The subjects in this
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when it was consistently invalid. However, they
subsequently rated the people who gave the misleading
gaze cues as looking more untrustworthy.
When we interact with other people we acquire
direct evidence about how trustworthy they are from
their behaviour. Singer et al. (2004a) used the setting of
a sequential trust and reciprocity game (iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma) to let subjects learn that some
people consistently played fairly (cooperators) while
others consistently played unfairly (defectors). After
this experience, the subjects rated the faces of the
defectors, not only as less likeable, but also as less
physically attractive. In parallel with these changes in
the perception of the faces, there were increases in
neural activity elicited by the presentation of faces of
cooperators and defectors in comparison to neutral
faces. An important feature of this experiment was that
some players were presented as freely choosing their
responses, while others were said to be simply following
the instructions. The behavioural and neural effects
were signiﬁcantly more marked in response to the
players who were presented as intentional agents. For
example, the presentation of intentional cooperators
elicited more activity in the amygdala, insula and
reward-related areas such as striatum and orbitofrontal
cortex. These are areas generally associated with
emotions, in this case positive emotions. This result
conﬁrms the suggestion that social cognitive processes
are preferentially engaged when people believe they
are interacting with intentional and free agents
like themselves.
In the experiment just described, the subjects
learned about previously unknown people by interact-
ing with them. But we do not have to interact directly
with people to ﬁnd out something about them. We can
also learn about their reputation from others. We are
told that X is reliable while Y cannot be trusted.
Delgado et al. (2005) had their subjects read vivid
descriptions of potential trading partners indicating
praiseworthy, neutral or suspect moral character.
Subsequently, the subjects were scanned while they
interacted with these partners in a trust and reciprocity
game. Although all their partners behaved identically in
the game, the subjects were more likely to make risky
investments with the partner previously described as
‘good’. During games of this kind, the activity in the
striatum is observed, which differentiates between
positive and negative feedbacks (i.e. whether trust is
reciprocated or not). This is consistent with the idea
that the striatum is part of a neural circuit that guides
and adjusts future behaviour on the basis of reward
feedback (Delgado 2007). However, in the experiment
of Delgado et al. (2005), very little striatal activity was
seen except when interacting with the neutral partner.
It appears that once partners had acquired a repu-
tation, the subjects paid much less attention to their
actual behaviour in the game.
In a recent experiment by Kosfeld et al. (2005), trust,
as measured through a sequential trust and recipro-
city game, could be increased by administration of
oxytocin, a neuropeptide that plays a key role in social
attachment and afﬁliation behaviour in non-human
mammals. Interestingly, the authors could show that
oxytocin speciﬁcally affects an individual’s willingness
to trust another person, i.e. to accept social risks arising
through interpersonal interactions with an intentional
agent who may not reciprocate your trust, but was not
due to a general increase in the readiness to bear risks in
a lottery game with the same pay-offs.
(d) The framing effect
The framing effect provides another example in which
emotion appears to interfere with a rational decision. In
this case, if the identical problem is framed in different
ways, the frame affects the decision that is made
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Consider a situation in
which a strategy has to be chosen to deal with the
outbreak of a potentially fatal illness. Would you take
course of action A which will save 200 people (out of
600), or would you choose the more risky action B?
This latter option may save every one, but brings with it
the risk that no one will be saved. With this frame (the
gain frame), the majority of respondents choose the
non-risky course A. The same problem can be framed
in a different way. Would you take course of action A
which will allow 400 people to die (out of 600), or
would you choose the more risky action B. This option
may save every one, but brings with it the risk that every
one will die? With this frame (the loss frame), the
majority of respondents choose the risky course B. The
ﬁrst frame emphasizes the possibility that the risky
option may result in more deaths than the safe option.
The second frame emphasizes the possibility that the
riskyoption maysave more lives than the safe option. In
fact, the probabilities are the same in both the cases.
De Martino et al. (2006) used fMRI to measure
brain activity while subjects made decision about
problems that were framed in this way. They observed
increased activity in the amygdala in association with
the framing effect, i.e. when choosing the safe option in
the gain frame and the risky option in the loss frame.
They concluded that the framing effect is driven by
emotional responses.
But, as was the case with responses to unfair offers in
the ultimatum game, even if a decision is inﬂuenced by
emotional factors, this may not be a bad thing in an
interactive setting.
In real-life interactions between people, the way that
an utterance is framed is by no means irrelevant. People
typically communicate more than that which is
explicitly stated in their words. Pragmatics is the
study of this communicative aspect of language
(Levinson 1983). Sher & McKenzie (2006) studied
how subjects interpreted the remark, ‘This glass is half
full’ as opposed the apparently equivalent remark,
‘This glass is half empty’. Subjects inferred that these
remarks revealed the speakers expectations about the
glass. If the speaker had expected the glass to be full
then they would say, ‘This glass is half empty’ thereby
emphasizing the change. Sher and McKenzie call the
implications of the way something is framed as
information leakage and suggest that these implications
are made by the speaker and drawn by the listener at a
largely unconscious level. At this level of processing,
frames affect decisions in much the same way that facial
expressions or gestures. The information provided by
such framing can be useful. However, frames can also
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messages can be rendered misleading or outright
deceptive. This technique is now widely practiced by
politicians (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007).
6. COGNITIVE CONTROL IN DECISION MAKING
If emotion is seen as the enemy of reason, then we
w o u l de x p e c tt oﬁ n dh i g h - l e v e lm e c h a n i s m sf o r
controlling emotion and preventing its damaging
effects. This was the interpretation for the study of
the framing effect put forward by De Martino et al.
(2006). Across the subjects in this experiment, the
activity in orbital and ventromedial PFC predicted a
reduced susceptibility to the framing effect. Similar
regions are proposed as sources for the more general
control of emotion in the review by Ochsner & Gross
(2005). These regions of PFC are seen as enablingus to
overcome the undesirable effects of emotion.
(a) Economic decision making
As we have seen in the case of the ultimatum game, the
decisions generated by emotional responses need not
per se be classiﬁed as poor decisions. The emotional
response to an unfair offer may be the basis for altruistic
punishment, which, in turn, can increase cooperation
and hence may provide greater rewards at the level of
the group. In this case, it would seem inappropriate for
high-level control systems to be brought into play to
override the effects of emotions. A more plausible
scenario is for there to be competition between two
competing tendencies: to beneﬁt the self or to beneﬁt
the group (Fehr & Camerer 2007).
To investigate the role of PFC in the control of such
motivational response tendencies, Knoch et al. (2006)
used TMS to disrupt speciﬁc regions of the PFC while
subjects played the ultimatum game. Application of
TMS over right but not left dorsolateral PFC
(DLPFC) caused subjects to accept unfair offers even
though they still recognized that these offers were
unfair. These results suggest that functions of the
DLPFC usually help inhibit self-interested tendencies,
in this case, to take all the money offered irrespective of
whether social norms are violated or not. In contrast to
this result is the study by Koenigs & Tranel (2007) of
patients with lesions to ventromedial PFC. These
patients showed the opposite tendency: they were
more likely to reject unfair offers. Does this reﬂect a
failure to inhibit prosocial tendencies?
In general, high-level control comes into play when
we try to override rather automatic tendencies. Inhibi-
tory control can be applied as much to prosocial
motivation and behaviour as to self-interest. This idea
is explored in a recent study by Rilling et al. (2007).I n
this study, brain activity elicited during a trust and
reciprocity game was related to psychopathy scores in a
sample of students. Both brain activity and behaviour
suggested that students with low psychopathy scores
had a bias to cooperate, while those with high psycho-
pathy scores had a bias to defect. Of particular interest
were those trials where the students acted against type,
i.e. low scorers defecting and high scorers cooperating.
In both the cases, these trials were associated with
greater activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC). Rilling and colleagues suggest that this
activity in DLPFC reﬂects the effortful exertion of
high-levelcognitivecontrol.Thisisconsistentwithmany
accounts of the role of DLPFC as selecting between
competing action possibilities (e.g. Frith 2000). We
further speculate that such control is possible only when
we are aware that these automatic biases are in play.
(b) Moral dilemmas
There are remarkable parallels between the economic
decisions we have discussed above and moral decisions.
In both the cases, there seems to be a conﬂict between
reason and emotion and the same brain regions are
implicated. The rational approach to moral decisions is
often referred to as utilitarianism and has the same
roots as the idea in economics that the correct choice in
any decision is the one that maximized utility (e.g.
wealth or happiness). The principles behind moral
choices can be revealed by presenting subjects with
moral dilemmas, in which a choice has to be made
between two bad outcomes. A famous example is
known as the trolley problem.
A trolley is running out of control down a track. In its
path are 5 people who have been tied to the track by a
mad philosopher. Fortunately, you can ﬂip a switch
which will lead the trolley down a different track to
safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to
that track. Should you ﬂip the switch or do nothing?
The ‘rational’ utilitarian answer is that you should
ﬂip the switch since ﬁve deaths are worse than one
death and most people agree that it would be right to
ﬂip the switch (Greene et al. 2001). However, with
another version of the dilemma the opposite result
is obtained.
A trolley is hurtling down a track towards ﬁve people.
You are on a bridge under which it will pass, and you
can stop it by dropping a heavy weight in front of it. As
it happens, there is a very fat man next to you—your
only way to stop the trolley is to push him over the
bridge and onto the track, killing him to save ﬁve.
Should you proceed?
Confronted with this dilemma most people say no.
From a utilitarian point of view, this problem is no
different from the previous one. So why do people
typically make a different decision? Greene and
colleagues confronted subjects with these problems
while they were being scanned and report that the
second trolley problem elicits greater activity in brain
regions concerned with emotional processing. So, the
argument is that the emotional response to the thought
of directly killing someone by throwing them into
the path of the trolley interferes with the rational
(i.e. utilitarian) processes of decision making when
confronted with moral dilemmas. This is the same
explanation as for the irrational behaviour in the
ultimatum game.
(c) The effect of frontal lobe damage
on social decisions
The implication here is that in the absence of an
emotional response, we would choose the more
utilitarian option. This prediction was examined
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lesions to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC),
since such patients have reduced emotional responses.
The prediction was conﬁrmed. These patients chose
the utilitarian option even though such options
involved emotionally aversive behaviours such as
pushing a fat man into the path of the trolley.
Note, however, that this is the opposite result to that
obtained with the same patients when they played the
ultimatum game (Koenigs & Tranel 2007). In this case,
the patients, as we have seen, were more likely than
comparison groups to reject unfair offers, i.e. they
rejected the utilitarian option due to an exaggerated
response to unfair offers. Given these contradictory
results, a simple explanation in terms of altered
emotional responsiveness does not seem viable. There
is, however, a critical difference between studies of
moral dilemmas and studies of economic decision
making. In the neuroeconomic studies, the subjects
were actually making decisions and gaining or losing
money. By contrast, the studies of moral dilemmas
were off-line. No decisions were made and there were no
consequences. Rather, subjects indicated what
decisions ought to be made. We do not know
(fortunately) what decisions they would have made if
confronted with such dilemmas in real life. So, the
experiments on moral dilemmas are not really about
decisions, but about knowledge of social rules.
A striking feature of patients’ VMPC damage is that
they can have marked abnormalities of decision making,
especially in relation to social conduct, while having
preserved conscious knowledge of the appropriate
behaviour in social situations (e.g. Saver & Damasio
1991). The problem for these patients is that their
frontal lobe damage prevents them from using this
knowledge to override the various low-level biases,
discussed above, that inﬂuence our decision making.
This can result in inappropriate cooperation (e.g. ente-
ring into ill-advised business partnerships; Eslinger &
Damasio 1985) as well as inappropriate selﬁshness.
Perhaps this dissociation between high-level conscious
knowledge and low-level biases produces abnormalities
in the other direction as well. When consciously
accessing the rules of social behaviour, rather than
actually making decisions, patients with VMPC damage
may be less inﬂuenced by low-level biases elicited by the
frame in which the decision scenario is presented. As a
result, their responses are more utilitarian.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In the previous section, we have emphasized different
aspects of social cognition which inﬂuence decision
making: emotional intuitions, motivational bias and
high-level executive control processes. For example,
there is a bias to be prosocial and to maximize gains for
the group, and this motivational bias competes with
another bias to maximize gains for the self. This
competition can also be solved by high-level control
mechanisms. These control mechanisms can, to some
extent, override emotional impulses and motivational
biases of either kind. This high-level control is also
strongly social in character. We are taught to recognize
our low-level biases and overcome them. It is at this
level that culture and social norms have their effect
(Shweder et al. 1990). We know very little about how
these high-level social effects operate at the neural level.
We have, however, summarized some evidence that
lower-level responses can be strongly modulated by
whether we believe another person is an intentional
agent or not and thus responsible for its actions as well
as whether we belief this person’s actions were fair or
justiﬁed. Furthermore, hints for cultural inﬂuences are
beginning to emerge from various sources including
studies of race prejudice.
As Phelps & Thomas (2003) remind us, 40 years ago
it was not uncommon for white Americans to express
negative attitudes to black Americans. However, recent
studies have shown that white Americans’ explicit
attitudes are signiﬁcantly less biased today. This is
presumably a cultural effect. But at the same time there
is robust evidence that, when attitudes are assessed
implicitly, most white Americans still demonstrate a
negative attitude towards black Americans (e.g. Phelps
et al. 2000). The greater this implicit (unconscious)
prejudice, the greater the response in the amygdala
elicited by the presentation of the faces of unknown
black Americans. However, the magnitude of this
activity is not correlated with explicit measures of
prejudice. This is clear evidence for the independence
of implicit and explicit attitudes at the neural level. In a
subsequent experiment (Cunningham et al. 2004), the
faces of the black Americans were presented, either
very brieﬂy (30 ms) or for a longer period (535 ms).
The amygdala activation associated with implicit
(unconscious) race prejudice was much reduced
when the faces were presented for the longer period.
Furthermore, the magnitude of activity in PFC
predicted how much the amygdala activity would be
reduced for the long presentations. Cunningham et al.
concluded that this is evidence that activation in
dorsolateral PFC and anterior cingulate is associated
with attempts to control unwanted prejudicial
responses to black faces. A key question for future
neuroimaging research will be to investigate whether it
is necessary to become aware of these automatic
prejudices for the high-level control processes to
come into play (see Tsushima et al. 2006 for evidence
for this idea outwith the realm of prejudice).
These same processes apply to economic and moral
decisions also. On the one hand, our decisions are
guided by fast and largely unconscious intuitions as to
what feels right. On the other hand, there are
conscious, deliberate and rationalized (rather than
rational) processes strongly inﬂuenced by education
and culture (Loewenstein 2000; Engel & Singer 2008).
This is essentially the dual-process model of reasoning
described by Evans (2003). These two social processes
are seen most starkly in studies of law, which is, indeed,
a mechanism for making decisions in the context of
moral dilemmas. In Anglo-American jurisprudence,
the distinction is made between an intuition-based
sense of justice and reason-based dictates of law
(Goodenough & Prehn 2004). It has long been
recognized that both these two systems are important
for the development of the law. For example,
considerations of natural justice are required in order
to declare that some speciﬁc law is unjust and should
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we have reviewed here suggest that our intuitive
‘emotion’-based decisions incorporate important social
insights crucial for cooperative societies.
This conclusion implies a need to revise the idea that
emotion/intuition is the enemy of reason (Damasio
1994). It is not in dispute that these two systems may
often be in conﬂict. Rather, the data suggest that
decisions dictated by reason are not always good, while
decisions dictated by emotion are not always bad.
Damasio’s key idea (the somatic marker hypothesis) is
that patients with VMPC lesions make bad decisions
because these decisions are no longer guided by
emotions. In some circumstances, this lack of guidance
by emotions can lead to better decisions (e.g. Shiv et al.
2005), but in most situations the lack of emotional
guidance leads to bad decisions (Bechara & Damasio
2005). In economic decision making, we ignore our
intuitions and emotions at our peril.
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